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ON PRIORITIZING BILLS TO IMPLEMENT THE NEW ECONOMIC MECHANISM 
Ann Seidman and Robe rt 8 . Seid man 
- c:,Oc-
As does everv co untry , the La 0 PDR fa c es the p1c,ble m o f 
economizing ,:,n 3c ar c e ,:.l.raftin g resourc:'? S . Every ministry c lamo s 
to have its bi lls drafted instantly ; drafters run sca r ce 0 11 the 
g -ound . How t o prioritize the bills f c,r rJrafting ·?' .n.t th e LTuly 
Work.3hop , MOJ a.3ked the partic i pants t, ) ,:ons i d'?r t hr e<:: bill::: : A 
c hec k law , a la w o n govern ment pro,-::urement and a l and law Of 
these , there existed draft.:- f, )r the fir s t t\ 10 , !-x,t ·b rJ -3f +-0 ,--J in 
Phasss One and Two ,:,f the Fr c,ject by co n.su _tants u n der th e 
Harvard Proje ct . The third co nsisted main ly o f a titlina bi ll , 
:::pons, :::-r ?,j by th'? Wc·rld Bank an d supp0rt<::d by a $17 , OOC, 1)00 grant . 
These bills ha rd ly sesmed ..:,:, c ut to t he heart ,:,f the La o 
PDR' s d'?velopment prol :,lems . With all th<:: La0 PDR ' s 1:iiffi,::- 1 11.t i e s , 
in man y pe o ple ' s pric ,ri t i es a ,::;heck l 3w wr:,•_ild se'?rn rel 4 ti ·:'?ly 
low . So also , many people might put a lan d tit llnq proj e ct 
relative ly l 0w in thgi r s c a le 0 f pr i0r i t .i<::.s . Law '3 r r·<::>,::1 ting nr 
'::ransf·:,rrn ing inst it utic,ns l i l:e ban k s , !?du -=:ati ·: n , ag r i·.::lll+:. uL·al 
<::xtensi c,n , the marketing of agricult ural pr o du ct.3 , 1,·,d: 0 r hoalth 
:crnd saf<?ty , and th8 °nvirr::inmr:::nt =:,:,mg might- t:hinl-- h-=id "' 1 : ,;:_ih 0 r 
pr ic ,r i ty than a che,::: I: law - - sspe ,..;ially sin,:::e th<:? t.r0nd all ,_,vei-
t-he wr:,rl d ernphs1.siz es a sharp r1?d 1y:t:ic "1 i n the:: pie,::: 0 s r:,f papr:::r 
that b anks c ir cula tg- - or a t it li ng la w 0 sp r:::ci~llv s in c e 
et hni c minorities hold a relat iv 8l y large amount o f Lao PUR land 
1mder sy stem s 0 f ust om3ry 1 aw tr. whc·m th!? ,~,)n-::-0 pt nf r it: l'? Ins 
littl8 relevance . 
Wh at occ urred with respc:: ,::t to the la• ,,s :3el':? ctC?d f 0r . he 
.3umrner wo rksh op is eviden ce d in the pri o ri izati, ::,n ,:_,[ ,:,t her laws 
p roposed for enactment . To a grc::a+- <::xt<::>nt, thes'? ,::,:,n,~0 r n what we 
migh t t e rm ' businessmen ' s la ws ', co ncerned mainly with c0nt ra ct 
an d p r op erty law i n a ll their manif old f o rms . Pri c,ritization 
co nstitutes the principal modality of g o vernmr:::nt poli~y - na ~ing . 
Every g c,vernment has a long wish list c,f laws they ,rant to see 
enacted ; the y never have difficult y in findi ng proie ct s o n wh i ch 
to spe nd s c arce drafting resources . Th<:? rli ffi c ult poli cy 
q uesti, ::.,n co n c erns prioritizati o n . Why d o the se .i.aws receive 
pr i or it y in drafting , at the ineluctabl<:: l oss of oth!?r l aw s whi ch 
3lso urg<::ntly n e ed drafting? 
E'r:•llow ino a pr ob lem - solving mgthod olc,gy , 1r g fi rs t brie f ly 
·exarn i n<:: h ow Lao selg ct s b ill s fc ,r drafting . In that pr oce ss , 
foreian don o rs play a leading r oll? . Why those d o n o rs press f or 
... hi? \-.ills the do ,:,l_c::pends m·=:tin l y 11pc,n th oi i- jdr::>,..,_0gy, very 
broa dl y co n c eived : f, _ir exa ruple , th<:=i1 n,::.,tio 11s ._,f lv:,v✓ law 
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~ functions in the proces a o f transiti on , and h ow to use economic 
theory in policy - and law - makin g . To un dersta nd that , in the 
first Part of this paper , we discu2s those concepts t 0 ge~h 0 r ~ · th 
th eir alternatives . In the seco nd Part , we disc u sa why the Lao 
PDR acquiesces in those demands , an outco me that de~end~ · n part 
upc,n the e,:;onc ,rnic pressure the donors c an bring to bear , bu 
pe rhaps also in the p ro cess es by whi c h the Lao PDR makes its ~wn 
determ inati o ns of priority . Finally , we s u ggest h0w the Ia 0 PDR 
might bette r pri o ritize b ills . 
I 
TWO PERSPECTIVES ON LAW IN THE TRANSFORMATION PROCESS 
Th e process o f prioritization co nstitutes a pn:,. ::ess in \Jl1i..:h 
the World Bank and ot her d o n,) rs p la y a si9nifi ca nt rr )l<? . f c,r 
example , the W0rld Bank has made th<? payment of 3 $1"7, '.1no , 000 
t ranche of a proposed grant dependent upon the Lac · PDR ' s 
enactment o f a c h e •::k law . It has gran ted 3. lar ge sum ,-:,f m,:,ney 
,:,ver the nex t twenty - five year t,: , ti le 100% of t!1 ,.::, Lmd in t!1e 
Lao PDR. It has made arl' :ither tra11<:::he of t he propossd gr ,:rn t 
dependent up o n enactment of a govern ment pr0curenen t law (I 
think! ) . The Asia Develc,pment Bank has granted $400 , 000 t o 
ensu r e its drafting , ena ctm ent and ' mple me nt ati0n . 
Money talks . The Wor ld Ba n k shc,uted these p ri or iti es _i_n the 
Lao PDR' s ears . To understand why the Lao derision-mako.rs 
se le ct ed these bil ls and net o thers for d r a fting , we must 
e x amine , first , why the World Bank and o ther int erna tio n al don, ::,r3 
so o ften select la ws concerning businessme n ' s law f r)r u t·g_i_ng c,n 
the La o PDR f o r pr i 1.)rity , and mainly ass u!lle t hat the La c• FDR ,:;an 
successfu ll y copy those laws f r orn o th":'r , ' devel0ped ' ,-:,::,11 1 tr i<?'3, 
and , sec c,nd , why the Lao PDR .s,:, f requently ac·quies ,::g.? 1 n t hei r 
de ma nds for what wo uld seem desirable but relatively l ow w~iority 
bills . That d<?pends , self - evido.ntly , prim .c::iril up .,...,11 their 
ide, ::,l o gy , broa dl y ,:::once i ved . That id ec,lo gy came d c,wn h<:=-3 ,,-il/ ,:,n 
one side o f a wide - ranging debate amo ng s cholars . 
Today , n obo dy d oubts that a market econ omy require 2 a legal 
framework . Lao aggre.ssi vely purs ues the objective ,::,f ,::- eating 
that fr amework . Scholars and practiti0n ":'rs alike , h0wever , 
differ about the substance o f t he laws that o ught t ,.::, cu 11st itute 
that framework , o ver two iss11es. On<? cc ·nco.rns th<? q 11°ct i0n , 
1,vhether there ex i sts a o ne - sL:::e - suits - a ll l e gal f ram <::w,:,rk? 
Anot her asks whether t ha t framework co nc erns pr imaril y the laws 
that co n cern busi n essme n -- main l y property and co ntra ct ~n all 
the ir variety , o r whether it also co ncerns the la ~ s that 
struct ure the institutions that co n s titute the infras tructure 
·-Nithin wh ich busi n ess men ,:::haff e r , tr uck and barter? This Pat·t 
/ 
•' discusses each c,f these issues in turn . Preliminaril y , b,)wever , 
we examine the problem of marketization as it appear~ in the Lao 
PDR. 
A. THE PROBLEM FACED BY THE LAO PDR 
8gg inning with the Chinese Ref or m and Open F,:,li, -·v c:-f 1c,79 , 
and a•:::celerated by the demise of the S,:,v iet Uni, ·. , sn many 
co untries have declared the objective of a c hieving one o r another 
form c,f a market - driven economy that they have re ,:::eived their own 
name : " Transitional economies " . The Lac, FDR falls in that 
general category . From the revolution of 1975 until the 
promulgati0n of the New Economic Me1::hanism in 1985 , · th 0 Lao FDR 
sought to i mplement a centrally - planned econ omy . The NEM 
proclaimed the objective of a market - driven economy . 
In that objective , the Lao FDR resembled the o ther, f ormerly 
(more or less) socialist countries that have also declared 
themselves for a market economy . The phrase " transiticnal 
economies '', however, paints with a very broad brush . Long before 
the tran~iti,)1, the highly industrializ<?d , lar9ely 11rbani:=ed 
ecc,nr:•mies like the former German D<?mocratic RepuL,li,:: (East 
Germany) or Czechoslovakia had achieved a rlegree of 
~pec ialization and exchange that embraced practi _ally the gntire 
population . There , the problem of planning had largely become 
one of coordinating already - existing , relativel y modern 
product i on units , and ensuring that their 0utput matche~ c0nsumer 
demands. The problem of the t ran.siti 1: 1 n theri? ,.:;,='n.sislw.d of 
~hanging t h~ m9chani.sm that ar rn mplish 0 rt those ta?~S frr~ Flan tn 
o ne or another so rt of Market. 
As it is f0r China and Vietnam , for th 0 La 0 F_R the 
transition poses other problems. There , large porti,_•11s of tl 18 
populat ion remain largely excluded from the syst em of 
3pecialization and exchange. In the Lao FDR, most of its 
population remains rural . As other tl1ird world countries seeking 
to devel 0p , both in the Plan period (19 7 5-85) and ?i1r 0 , the L~n 
PDR has had the task of transforming its institutions from th o se 
c hara ct eristic of colonial economies to ones cha racte rize bv a 
high degre e of .specialization and exchange. 
Like other colonial economies , the colonial Lan <?con0rny 
exhibited all the characteristics of dependency: In La ~ ' s ca~e , 
a tiny export sector consisting mainly of logging and opium , and 
a vast hinterl:=rnd in which m0st nf th<? pnp11 at ·_0n Li .· aj , 1_sing 
hoe agriculture technology and with precio us little 
sp ·ecialization and exchange . The Lao FDR government since 197 5 
has taken as its principal task t ransf arming th<? in st it 11t i c·n.s 
that co nstituted that econc ,my to ones with a h iab degree o f 
/ 
•.. 
monetizat ion and much higher technology and produ ct ivi ty , wi t hout 
developing the markedly str0.tified societies that cha ra. cte ri ze 
much o f the third world . Since (as we discu2s .belc,w) 
g o vernment ' s principal instrument for indu c ing in st ituti 0 nal 
change consists of the legal order , the La0 PDR ' s task ,:-onsists 
of 'dhat elsewhere in th'? Third Wo rld has been denc ,ted the proble m 
of law and development . 
Over laden on that primary task , sin ce 1 qR ', the i IEJJ ha3 
superimposed another : Moving fr om the rather hesii -:=rnt ~teris 
t0wa rds a planned economy that La o toc,k :;_ 97 5 - 1~::i85, and 
s ubstituting market imperatives . In the latter , it r ese mbled 
0 ther transitional societies ; in t::.he former , it rl?semJ:,J ed. n c,t the 
_ransitional societies , but the developing world g <?nerally . That 
combination co nstituted Lao ' s specifi c version of the p r o blem 0f 
transforma.ti o n . It is against that background that "'.'=' con0 ider 
the cont rovers i es ab ou t the general problem of t h e legal 
framework for transiti onal economies . 
B. ONE-SIZE-FITS-ALL OR CUSTOM-MADE? 
Theoreticians of the transiti o nal e c0 n0mies fell int ,::, two 
ca mps . One -- the co nventional wisdom -- per c eived their task as 
o ne of discovering the univer s al re cip e for the transition . For 
them , the central di c h otom ie s became Big Bang vs . incremer1talism , 
private vs state property , market vs plan . Pes0l vin0 th e se 
dichot0mies woul d pr oduce th e d es ir ed univ e r sal r ec i pe . 
n t he l:' S t::r,r;,k a co nt r 21ry Vie Thi:;, SP:=tr,:: h f ,::, l:' :=in 1J!l i ',/P r'.'3 ,:1 l 
r e,: ip1:: f c,r the tr.ansiti c,n hunts the ch imera . Until e:·:t-•ressed in 
laws and r1::gulations , po li cies co nc erning the tran sit ion 
c0nc erning the co ndu c t o f the e c0 nomy , ownersh ip ..-.f pr0r 0 rty , :=tnd 
rate o f transition -- sho ut in th1:: wind . 1 Unless they respond 
specifically t 0 the irnperat-j ves c,f th1::ir- p arti,:::ula1 ~ time .==rnd 
pla,:e , l aws and regulati, .::-,ns remain all grc Avl and n,-, bit, :::-; ,:-,:,n <?;(t:: 
is all . The true di c h oto my in devel c,pment lies r,eLw1::en d 0 c isi c,n -
JT1aking by c0okb00 k 0r ty cc,ntext . Coc-,!-:bc,ok ,1<:>c-i .o-:inn - n1;::1\.:j ;,? ,.11 
bu t i nva riabl y invokes ec o n 0mi c t hec•ry as metaphc,r rather than 
heuristic , and economic th1? 0 ries that deny the cen~raJ it y of 
institutions . Fi .r st , W'? addu ':'32 thi s ,-·,::,nt-est .:3.t::ic,n 1-.y 1:::-~amining 
how p o li c y works itself out in the workaday world , t hat i s , 
thr-)ugh the legal order ; se co nd we examine the prr: :,blem ·39ain in 
light ,:,f the peculiar ove rla y o f the la w- and - d1::velc ,prnent prc,blem 
with that o f the transiti o n from Plan to Market . 
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•'· 1 . From p o licy to law: the problem of insti tu t i c,nal c hange . 
Without more , policy d o es no more than mate newsp aper 
headlines : " Government plans to bring water to . every v illage" , 
0r "Governm ent plans to introduce a system o f pa~n ent by ch eck ". 
Until transformed int o government action , no thi ng h:ipp<?ns . 
Governme n t policy to mo ve towards a market me,::hani srn ha s no 
c0 ncrete meaning until government acts. 
Gov ernment acts through the legal order , brnadly rnnre · ved 
as the laws and the institut io ns that make and implemen t them . 
To understand how p o lic y actually works we must theref o 1e exam i ne 
how law works t o c ar ry it out . On that issU<3 , t o,::, 11°c· ,-•C'nsc::-n3us 
exi3t3 . 
One v iew holds that overnmen appr op r iat"=!ly us 0 s J av.,, 'vhen 
it identifies a soc ial problem , and d"=!scribes in no rma tive _erms 
the desired state of affairs. For some who adhere t0 this vi"=!w, 
that implies that la serves 0 nly 3S the rules of t he Jitigatinn 
ga me . It mere l y pres c ri b es rights and duties , s o that judges c an 
just l y resolve disputes. Everything aft"=! r _ hat: on,::;13r 1s 
implementation , not law . For o hers , law ,::;c,ncer n 3 beha \·i;::,r , b1Jt 
t hey draw a sharp line betw een the law and its im p lemen t a io n . 
Writ i ng rul"=!s pres c ribing the d esire d end res Ll t ,~r.n"' _ i h1+-<=>."' 
law ' s f un ,: tion ; all after that co ns t itut es lrnpl em<:?nt a ti ,~•n . I 11 
either ev'?.nt , one - size - fits - all h ol ds ; wh at c0 nsti t ute s a 1 u .st 
3nd wise ob j "::!1..,tive d,::,es n,-,_ differ frr'm sc,ci"=!_:l t,-, ;;;c•,:2<?1:-.-
The c0 ntrar y view h0lds that law \ orl,.s b rhar.n°J I nc1 t) -.0 
l 1<?h3vic,r c,f its official and w-,n- ,:,ffi::ial c1ddr<?SS"c·0 s . ',,T, -·-=irn,,:,t-
·nminand water t c, r:,::-,ndu ct · ts 0 lf tc, ev<?ry village . It ,-rt I dirr?• _·t 
vari,:, us acto r s , both l ay and o ff i,::;ial , abnut h 0i - l- )v?y ,·,ught- tn 
bsha ve , and back thosg dirs c ti 0 ns up with various ~~r~s 0 f 
~0 nf o rmity - indu c ing measures (and no t o nly punishm 0 nts! ) . 
Repetitive patterns of behavior by definiti o n c0 nstitute 
institut i c,n.s . A marketized differs fr om a p lanned e r.0nc• 1ny !~,y th 0 
ins t i t uti o n.s that co nstitute it: Planned e c,:,nomies , by plan ni ng 
co mmis s ions , plan enforcement mechanisms , instituti o ns for supply 
and delivery that depend not o n bargaining b ut on di rgct ive s by 
c entralized institutions , enterprises that determine prod uc ti on 
and prices in obe dien ce to di r e c tives , and so f o rth ; mark"=!t 
econo mies , by parties bar ga i ning with ea ,:::h ot her , ent":'rprises 
t hat set pro d uc t i ve priorit i es and prices in respo n se to market 
s ignals , and so forth. To change from a plann ed t o a market 
econo my requires massive c hanges in behaviors by a myria of 
economic actors . Government seeks t o induce these lf' t,, , ed 
b ghavi o rs thr o ugh the legal ordgr . Th us d o":'s govgrnmen t 
implement po li cy ; t hus d o es it transf or m in stitutions . 
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How does law work to change behaviors? That r<?.quires an 
understand ing of why people behave as they d o in th e f ai:::C? ,:,f a 
rule o f law . People do that by choosing among the co ns t raints and 
resources thr 0wn up by their own co untr y - specific <?nvir0nrn.ents --
o f which t he rule of law and its threats and pr c,rnise.::.; ,::::c,ns t i t ute 
but one among many. 2 These in clude , not only their c,bj ecti ve 
c ircumstances , but alsc, their own subj ec:ti V'? interest s , val u es 
and ideologies shaped by their count ry- sp<3cifi c •~:i.r, :::ums t an ,::es . 
figure 1 captures that proposition . 3 
f'IGURE 1 
A MODEL OF LAW AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR(a) 
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Cf . fREDERIK BARTH, MODELS OF ,OCIAL 0 RGAHIZATI.: ll / Ruy,,l 
Anthropological 
Univer s ity Press] 
6 . 
Institute Occasi o nal Pap<?r 2 3 [ (~lasg,- ,,-,r: 
196 6) . Seidm~rn and Seidman , supi-:3. n . 11 , Ch . 
The model bases itself on legal realis m, whi c h h 9 ld th~t an 
essential question always concerns behavior in th e fa ce~ £ a rule 
o f law (the realists spoke of th e systemati c dif f erenr 0 b 0 tween 
t he ' law - in-the - b o oks ' and ' the - la H- in - a ,:::ti o n ' ) . See Karl 
Llewellyn , " Some Realism about Realism " .. . xx . The mo del folds 
int o the contempora ry analytical p0si tivi st pgr c eptinn ,::,f ths 
1.111i ver s e o f rules [HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW Al!D STATE 
(1949) ; H.L . A . HART, THE CONCEPT Of LAW (1962)] the so c i c,logi c al 
and anthropological noti o n of a c ion as choicss within a range o f 
,::onstraints and resources thrown up by the env ir o nment not 
always rational choice , but ch o ice nevertheless. See Barth, supra 
n . xx . 
.. 
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It f,)llows that law - making must take implementatic ,n into 
ac co unt . The co mmo n complaint , "we have good laws b1-l t bad 
implementation " states an oxymoron . It als o follows th~t a 0ne -
size - fits - all legal framework for a market economy cannc,t work . 
A law that induces o ne sort c f behavior in one time And pla~e 
will ,:,nly accidentally indu c e the same behavi,.::,r in an, =•ther tim<? 
c,r place . A legal framew ork t hat will indu c e market-enhan c ing 
behaviors in Ruritania will 0nly acc·identally indu,::<? t-h'=' sam'? 
sc,rts o f behaviors in Booga - Booga . The search f or a universal 
formula for a legal framew ork for a market '?.conomy do'?'.:' ind<?.ed 
search for the c himera . 
Those propositio n s hav'? profound implicati0n2 f0r the 
prioritization of law that Lac, select3 f or drafting , ,l ·ng five 
differ 0 nt dimensions . 
a . Three invalid did1(:,tc,mies . That law add1e3se2: behavior 
rl.isposes of the supposed dichotomi 0 s that hav 0 sn milch ,~0n •-:-erned 
the 3Cholars of transitir,n . No univPrsal 2::"e,~ir0 e-:L_':s f,::-,r ti1'~ 
rate of transition ; whether big bang or in creme nta l or it1 between 
depends on context . The same h~lds f0r t-) e pnt-iGn that-
privatization ,::onstitutes a :3ilv8r J:.ullet t c· re.c::-::,lve -:IJ tl13.t 
ails the transitional e .-::-onomi '?S , c-,;r that a.11 planning rn11 .c:t .f adP 
a ay in the fa ce of the demands 0f marketi=at-i,:·,n : Tri t-f-·ese 
issues too , context is all . 
b . The l-:inds and uses of econ,~ •mic: the,: ,ry . I 1 pr i - 1 1 ti= ing 
bills , many thec ,ri s ts inv o ke neoclassi ca l (that is , non-
institutional) economics as a metaphor . Tbey c0 2ider thn r 0 aJ-
life situation , and find in it sorni? mc:i.rk8t-likP c:h:ir-i,·' c:"·[.-;t [--.- . 
They then abandon the real world t<:i co nsult the marl -:0 1- mndei 
Drese nted by neoclassical econ0mi•:-s . Ba c;'?d en ti r 0 l v , n hat 
mc:d8l n o t on an in vest iga tion int o the la c, FDR' E; .::p,::_;,::if ,::: 
circu mstances , they recommend the rri0ritizati0n of las . If th8 
nY•d8l abr:::,v8 holds , f, ::,r law - ma J,:j ng , drafter .::: must 1_1.="? -:'\!1 °,:-,::•n·-,mi,:-
theory that per c eives institu t i o n s as the c r it l, ·a L l ,11 LL,.i i. nu 
hJ, ::-,cks of the economy , and that uses th 0 c-ry nr-t t-, , rric11--r=> r•r:' l j_r • 
tut to guide empirical inve stigations into the La0 ro~li' J . 
,: . c:01Jying the la 3 of 0 h~:- ..... ount rig2. Th0 1-,rr,:~r-\si_ tir) 
that law addresses be havi or declares invalid a variety of :::la im3 
f t-eq 11ently mad'? a0 1::>ut t he laws that Lao should adopt: I'bRt Lao 
should copy either some 0t her co untry ' s law (a8 Professnr Schmit 
claime d that La o should copy Ho lland ' s entire Code) , or a 
supposed ' international standard ' law (such as the rr0p081?rl chPck 
law) .. Whether La o ought to adopt any particular law depen ,:·b up c,n 
an eilipirical study of that law ' s conseque nces in the spe c ific Lao 
:::irr::umstanc<?s . 
d . Copying the priori ties o f other cc,u n tri s.J . That 
proposition also declares invalid the cla im that a parti .~ul::,r law 
-- say , a check law o~ a ti tl ing l aw -- h olds a pri~ri~y place in 
every market economy , and theref o re a l so in La o ' s transltiun to a 
market economy . Lao ' s transition to a market e cc,17(,mV ha :3 r)f 
co urse some general res<::>mblan c es to ot he r tr;.,nsi t i, :,nal ':?,-·,:·nc•nies 
-- but many , many mor e differences . M1ether it o ught t0 adopt a 
ch<?.c::k law or a titling law ought to depe d up 0n -:1 ·1 emri r i ,:·al 
stud y of La o ' s spe c ifi c c ir c umstances , and a mat Ul 8 ju Jqn1e11 t_ Lhat 
those laws really do have a pra,::-tica l importan ,:·e th,t warr.::,nts 
the high pri 0r ity given the m. 
5 . Priorit ize problems , not laws . That propositinn sugg<?.~ts 
that Lao o ught not to prioritize the law that it want:3 drafted , 
but i-a the r the social behaviors t h at c o nstitute the diffi c ulty_ 
that Lao wants the new law t0 addres3 . For example , 1.-Jh<::>th'::'r Lao 
needs a check law remains subject to some doubt . Tha t lao needs 
a better payment system than carrying ar ou nd trunk l o ads 0 f kip 
not e s , hr:,wever , hardly bears argument . Many t rans i t ic ,nal 
eco n omies have prob lem s wi th payment systems . Whether a c he c k 
law or some o the r system (for example , ele c tr on i c tra~sfers 0r a 
GIRO system) woul d serve La0 better than a check la w, hc ,wever , 
aga in requires empir i cal re search . 
These proposit i ons L,ecc·me even more per sua s i-ve when 
,:::onsidered against the backdrop of the Lao PDR ' .s no.'?d f 0r laws 
that transf or m n o t o nly its eco n omy fr o m Plan t c-war d2 '=td:el:: , J:,ut 
from t he dependent , di c ho t omized c o lonial g,::on• _>111y t ,_. a hlqhly 
p rodu ctive , integrated r'?latively independent ec~n0my . 
That co ntext is all bee :,mes i11e s ,:::apaL ,le whe n ,; c'!i.:::..i.dt.:1111•.:J tl1•~ 
.se, :::ond demand o n tho. Lao PQR ' "" laws : Th 0 r 0 q1.d ro1n9n f~ t- I :1 r t- hey 
:lid n,:,t o nly the tran2ition frc·m Pan t,- , M:=n·1-:<?.'::, b11t:. 3.l-2,:• the 
transf o rmations requ ir ed to create a pr o du c tive , tela i vely 
modern economy , that is , o ne 1ith a high echn 0 l og _,, ?r'?=iter _: c,b 
0ppor t uni ties for all , and a high deg res c;f spe,:::iali = ::i. ti ,:,n and 
ex,:::hanae . We examine o ne law as a c::ase study : The ia1,,1 that 
within twenty - five years would title 100~ nf t h 0 p=irc~l~ ~f l~nd 
in th'?. La o PDR . 
Neoclassic:al e ,:::on011i c -2 argu<?-.s hat pg,::,ple ,:·ann, :·t b1-1y aw:l. 
sell land un less someone exists with the power t o sell , th a t the 
l aw clearly designatgs ~h3t person and the prerise diw 0 nsi~ns nf 
t::he la nd t hat he c r she liolcl:3 . Land in La o dc·es nc,t mr::1-?t thes'? 
requirements . In the ,_: i ties , p r o bably the sys te rn (-,[ t'?nllP:?S 
pr esently in f0rce amo ng the pe o ple d 0e~ r ecngpi=c ~ ~in 0l'=' 
'Jvvne r , but obscure l y , anJ bo11ndary lings ai sc , segHt va g u<?. 111 the 
• 
/. 
• 
,•· 
,::ountryside , hc,wever , more serious difficulties to ti tlirl<:J '::::~ist . 
40% of the Lao PDR' s population consists of members of ethni c 
minc,rities . M,:,st c·f these live in the mnuntaJns , 31t)·,_3i:=;ting by 
hoe agriculture . The y hold their land by custnrnar'y' re nu -es . 
Typically in customary tenures espe cially th0s 0 0 mp 1 nvinq 
shi fting agriculture -- nobody has the power to sell l~nd ; land 
b<:?longs t,) the co mmunity , both those now alive and t h•:•se 5:till 
unborn . Moreover , many people h3ve various sorts of cn~p li c at'?d 
rights in the land . Espe c i ally , 10men frequently have 1i ght s ,:,f 
user in land o therwise under the control of the h u:sb::=tnd. T0 
translate these co mplicated customary tenures int o a sirJle ~~ ner 
with a clear power to transfer title s ets these c u stomary t e nu1es 
all at windmills , t o the serious detriment of many ".·£' t-hc1.'3e in 
these co mmunities ,,, i th especial danger to wc,rnen . Mc•p=:, 
Without co nsiderable empirical res1?ar c h , ,v, one ,~Rn }~,c r'n~i ti ve 
that mar~etization of he J9nd rnns tit ut~s th 0 h 0 s t- wa · 0 
develop Lao ' s agr i c ultur e . li'Jhatev<:?r t he strength uf t h"? ,::,:1..::0 e 
t hat o ne c an make fnr title in Lao ' s llrhan and oeri - 11rl,.-=in -=i1 ·<?:::i~ , 
whether it constitute:3 the pri ,-,rity l.a1,1 f, -,r t-r7n3f, ,rn 1 i ng 
agricultura l landh o lding institutioJts requires exlensi ve stu dy . 
Ccntext is all . 
B. BUSINESSMEN'S LAW AS PRIORITY, OR AS 
CO-EQUAL WITH 'INFRASTRUCTURAL' LAWS? 
Max Weber argued that capita li sts r<:?qui re ah,,v'? all 
:ertainty in legal r elati o ns (especially , those gene ral!; r elate d 
to cont ract and property) . In ac c~ rd with his noti ons , and with 
some versions of ne 0 - ,::las~i , r1l ec,::,nomics , s0me acad,:::,mi ,~ .l.:1wyer-2 
(most ly in the US) maintained that what an earlier yenerati -::,n 
Gall ed ' pr iv ate ' law 4 contra t , property , and tort in al 1 
their elaborate variati o ns enforced principall y hy priva te 
litigatio n in the or dinar y law cc, ur ts -- co ns t ituted th <:: primary 
legal f rarnework for market e co nnmie.s. That vi 0 w ident if i'?d th 0 
legal framework of mar ket economies ~ith the s0r _2 o f law t h3 t 
b usinessmen invoked in t heir day to day legal relationships. It 
t o ld the Lao PDR that businessmen ' s laws t nn ~ pr ' rle n F p la ra n 
1::iraftin9 laws . 
An alternativ'? view contested ,Teber ' s. Th 0 rri.:=,1-k0 t- 1.:,r k-2' nrt-
.Jnly l•ecause o f businessmen ' s laws , b u t als 0 be ca use ,_,f an 
infrastructure , institutional and legal as w 0 ll "'IS :JhJ"' i ral . A 
market requires a whole mob o f th o se inst itutions and t he law ? 
ne, .:::es.sary to create , buttress a nd when ne cessary tn ,: hanoe them : 
4 Weber , no . 
r)f publi c law] . 
2 6 ; But see xx .... C0 hen [nn ,::;c,ntr act =i..::: a f orm 
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To ensure appropriate controls over the money supply an d c redit , 
the banks ; to ensure government fiscal resp o nsibilit y , the 
pr0 cesses o f budget formation and budget discipline; t o ~ns ur 0 ar 
educated work force , the educat i ona l system ; to ensur e a mob ile 
0rk force and s0 1-: ial stability , p 1blic:ly f inanc 0 d 01 rl ,r:i 0 "l!Yl 
disability pensi o ns ; ~o ensure a progressive agri c u lLu r a : se ,: t~r , 
the agricultural extension service ; t,) protect the envi r:-onment 
agains t the ravages o f pr ivat e greed , eff<:?ctive gnvi rc, nrne'l.t .3] 
protection agencies a long list . That view held t hctt in 
,:hoosing priority laws to draft , the Lao PDR. should wc,_i_qh the 
claims no t o nly of businessmen ' s laws , but al s o of all ~he l a 1s 
required t o bolster the market ' s institutional infrastru ct ur e . 
Weber was wr ong . Consider , f o r example , th<:? r,1·•~--b lem ,:,f 
bringing rice from the farmer to the consumer . It P~quires 
farmers who produce for the market (with all the s upr o rting 
institutions that that demands) , a , rice pr0cessing ~lan t , sto rag e 
facilities , a wholesaler , a retaile r , snmeplace or n ther 3 ba nk , 
and transp o rt bet we'3 .1 a ll +:. he s e . If th ese in s t i t u t i 1::>1.:0 · e.Y:' 2'::., 
but property and contract laws remain weak c1r nc,n-e ::.i st ent , i t 
makes sense to supp o se that ena~ting th o se laws .Ji ll enabl'? 
J: usinessrnen to make co n tracts between these <:?nt"?r p r i s '?3 , ,:n1,J to 
allow capital to move t c,warJs those sect ,:, rs . wlv:?re pr- :,f l t.3bl1?. 
opportunities exist th3t is , to mark8tiz'? the wh ~le . A 
bus ines sman who sees an ,::,,pp1)rtunity f c-r a new retail :.3t o re in 
Vientiane might then buy the land knowing that h 0 rill qet 000d 
t i tle , make co ntracts to bt.d ld a sL :,re , knc• ing t-ln ':: ,:::c,nt- 1- 7 .- •'- J ci.· '° 
makes it more likely that the c o ntra c t:1.::,r will perf, ::.,rn1, and e n t:.er 
i nt o purchase agrgements f 0 r ~t0ck 9nd fixturos. 
Supposg , however , that no ne c,f these institut io ns oxi,:=,t - . 
Titling rgal estate and strgngthening c~ ntr ac t l9w - r 
de vgloping a check system -- alone will n o t lik e ly c re al~ a rice 
p roducing and marketing system . Businessmen may then ha v e, sn me 
legal assurance that their engagements \ ill cc •me t ,::, f n 1i ti. 1:.-n, and 
that when they buy a piece of property they will likel y a c quire 
title . That al0ne will nc,t lead them t0 invest . Nc,t-,::-,dy will 
bui ld a ri c e processing plant unless farmers are prc ,du, ~:ing f r:,r 
the market . Nobody will b uild storage fa c ilities unless the 
p r oc essing plant and wholesalers e:;,dst . All '..-Jill die 2b o rning 
unless a bank and credit facilities exist . Without th'::se basic 
institutions , no businessmen will exist to invoke businessmen ' s 
la 1.J . 
In the Western , developed c0untrie .s , these er,.,:1.!:."rnc,1.12ly 
co mplica _ed networks of pr odu c tion , trade and credi _ ar o se 
incrementally , over hundr<:?ds of years . Ths Lao FDR. or c,p0s<:?s to 
j ump start int o a modern economy. That require s c ~r 0 ful 
:o nsidera t i o n not o nl y o f the laws t hat businessmen require , but 
... 3lso of the laws that will make the development of th":: rnarl:et ' s 
infrastructural institutions more likely . 
Thus far , we have o n ly succeeded in co mpli catin9 the 
problems of prioritizati0 Instead o f the rel3tively easy job 
of copying law and other cou ntries ' pri or ities , we have said that 
Lao must develop her own laws and priorities . Instead o f that 
sacred cow of transiti onal economic.s , privati::::a i on , we have said 
that Lao must determine case by case whether privatizati o n ought 
to go forward . Instead of the easy out 0f making law by 
metaphor , we have said that Lao must make la 1,, ,:,n the b:i::.= is c,f 
demand ing empirical research . Instead of limiting its attention 
i::0 laws required for the transiti o n from Plan t0 Marl-:et _, ,,,e have 
sug gested that La o must in c lud e in the ca l cu lus la ws lo 0 king to 
the development o f what remains a somewhat colo nia l e,:::r.:,nomy. 
Instead of lim iting the laws cons idered f r::,r pri0ri ti=-.,+- ir::>n t0 
' bus ine ssmen ' s laws ', we have suggested that the La ,:, PCR sho 1-1ld 
c0nsi der the claims ,::,f the laws c real:: ing ... be market ' s 
in f rastruct1Jre . 
r e quirements? 
II 
ON THE PROCESS OF PRIORITIZING 
Faced by a multit u de of demanJ.s for new laws , alld ba1·red 
from all the screening devices that so handily (if errc-- ,11'?r::•11~ly) 
seem ingly •-::cme t o the aide to th o::=e using tlnt- :i.lt r-"_-na.t: ~_--0 l e Jal 
ideology , how can the La0 FDR appropria tely prioritize its 
rlraftinq assignments? On puroly pragmati,-:: q -0un ds, VJ~ prnrnse 
these principles for prioritizing the t·ill - drafting task . 
1. Prioritize in terms nf s,:,,::::ial or0blems , not l.3,,,·:::. 
2 . Only prioritize in 
terms of social problems 
alternat iv es . 
terms ,:,f a 
<:::, ,nsidered 
five ','e':lr pl ::in, n,-,t 
singly :Hi:::! d '?·;,:,id 
j_ 11 
·= f 
3 . Canvass widely t,:, prepare t h e or iginal li st ,_,[ .3,::,-.::i.:11 
1Jr0blems. 
4 . Choose by exclusion , not by appar ent desirability . 
( i . e ., instead of selecting the ' most i111portant ' law:3 , cut- at +-h'? 
bot tom o f the li st soci al problem3 that , while imp orta n ... , ~re n0+-
so pressing at the moment. (In Charles Lindbl om's terms, s'?lect 
f n r priori i::y drafting th e most 1J rg<=>n t , n ot n<?•-·ess':'l r i_ ly t-h:, n.?t 
/ 5 . Choose the problem f rom which you will learn th~ mos . • 
.•. 
6 . And 
e . g . , don ' t 
pay at tentic,n to 
copy laws , don ' t 
the ' don ' ts ' earlier 
,-o y pri0rities (b11t-
other countries ' experiences) , don ' t use ec0n0Mi-
heuristic , remember thal the La o PDR has a dual 
transition and 0f development , etc . 
rn-c:ntioned , 
la"1rn fr, ·,m 
t ],,.._ 1_-y a.=; 
prr_.,i.·l em uf 
